President Trump’s Eastern European Strategy: Talking Tough While Achieving Minimal Isn’t Effective
Returning in the start of the year, with Donald Trump’s campaign vows to end the war in Ukraine “within 24 hours” still vivid in memory, there was real concern in the Russian capital over Trump’s intentions. After Mr. Trump mused that “high levels of Tariffs, Tariffs, and Restrictions” on Russia could be necessary, one well-known hawkish Moscow commentator remarked: “It is better to prepare for the worst. Soon, we’ll reflect on the previous term with fondness, like a thaw.”
Empty Threats and Failed Opportunities
How wrong can you be? Since then, the US president has repeatedly spoken a big game without managing to walking the walk. In May, after Vladimir Putin turned down a 30-day truce, and negotiation talks in Turkey went nowhere, a devastating” US penalties package did not to appear. An 8 August cut-off for Mr Putin to agree to a ceasefire inexplicably turned into a red carpet welcome in Alaska, where Mr Trump applauded a leader sought for atrocities as he stepped off from his plane. The serious consequences” warned of by Mr Trump should the Alaska talks failed to peace did not occur.
Encouraged Moves and Allied Weaknesses
Emboldened, Mr Putin has thus continued to pursue his war objectives in Ukraine, and probe for western weaknesses. Last week’s intrusion of Russian drones into Polish territory exposed inadequate Nato planning, as F-35 and F-16 fighter jets were hastily scrambled to counter cheap suicide devices that are priced around $10,000 each to produce. It also communicated a warning of possible intensification if any future “reassurance force” deploying European troops on Ukrainian soil. Such challenge called for a robust and coordinated response, exerting the kind of pressure on the Kremlin which Mr Trump has so far refused to countenance. Instead the US president seems, once again, to prefer pressuring his European allies to targeting Mr Putin. In a announcement which reeked of bad faith, Mr Trump stated over the weekend that the US was “prepared” to impose tougher sanctions on Russia, but only if certain unlikely conditions were met.
Unrealistic Demands and Trade Pressures
Aiming for a significant economic gain, Washington is insisting that the EU must increase its imports of US LNG at a rate that analysts consider undoable. Other demands include the application by the EU of 50%-100% tariffs on Russia’s most important ally, China, and an end to all imports of Russian oil by Nato members. This includes Turkey, which has declined to sanction Moscow, imports 57% of its oil from Russia, and lies outside the EU.
Those looking on the positive side in Brussels hope that Mr Trump’s pressure may convince pro-Trump governments in Hungary and Slovakia to end their heavy dependence on Russian energy imports. That is highly unlikely to happen, as Mr Trump and his advisers must know. Nor can the EU afford to risk the kind of economic response from Beijing that caused Mr Trump himself to back down from a full-blown trade war not long ago.
Ominous Developments and Lack of Movement
Throughout this week’s state visit, it will be Sir Keir Starmer’s turn to try to pin Mr Trump down on decisive action. But from the unproductive Alaska talks to his latest distracting tactics with the EU, Mr Trump keeps finding reasons not to get tough on Russia. Last week’s drone incursion in Poland represented an worrying upping of the ante. Ukraine’s prospects, and wider European security interests, are being steadily undermined by a president who, in this context, threatens but never acts.